The Governing Body of the Rivonia Primary School v MEC for Education, Gauteng Province

 

 Case No.  Lower Court Judgments  Hearing Date
 CCT 135/12 South Gauteng High Court, 7 Dec. 2011

Supreme Court of Appeal, 30 Nov. 2012

 9 May 2013

By Greg Palmer on 17 April 2013.

The case concerns whether it is the Provincial Department of Education or the governing body of a public school that has the power to determine the number of learners that the school may admit, and whether the Provincial Department of Education may override any determination in this respect by a governing body.

In 2010 the governing body of Rivonia Primary School (“the School“) had prepared an admission policy which was accepted by the Gauteng Department of Education (“the Department“).  According to this policy the capacity of the school was set at 770 learners, of which 120 would be admitted to Grade 1.

The School had declined to admit a child to its Grade 1 class for the 2011 school year. The child was twentieth on the waiting list of applicants for admission. The mother of the child appealed to officials in the Department. A few weeks into the 2011 school year the head of the Department instructed the principal of the School to admit the child. Before the governing body of the School had made a decision on the instructions of the Head of Department, in a letter to the principal the Head of the Department purported to withdraw the principal’s admission function. Officials from the Department arrived at the School shortly thereafter to physically place the child in a classroom.

The relevant provision is Section 5(5) of the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996 (“the Act“), which provides that subject to the Act and any applicable provincial law, “the admission policy of a public school is determined by the governing body of such school.”

The South Gauteng High Court held, per Mbha J, that the Act does not appropriate to the school governing body the unqualified power to determine the school’s admission policy, and that the power to determine the maximum capacity of a public school in Gauteng vests in the Gauteng Department and not in the school governing body.  It also held that the Member of the Executive for Education, Gauteng Province, has the power to intervene in the school governing body’s power to determine the admission policy of a public school.

The Supreme Court of Appeal, per Cachalia JA writing for a unanimous court, held that the governing body’s power under section 5(5) of the Act to determine the admission policy of a school necessarily includes the power to determine the school’s capacity.  Any doubt of this is removed by section 5A of the Act, which allows the Minister of Education to prescribe minimum and uniform norms and standards for ‘the capacity of a school in respect of the number of learners a school can admit’, and then requires the school’s governing body to comply with these norms and standards when compiling the school’s admission policy.

The Supreme Court of Appeal overturned the order of the High Court (save for the order of costs in that court, and relief pertaining to the withdrawal of the School principal’s admission function), and declared that the instruction given to the School principal to admit the learner contrary to the school’s admission policy, and the placing of the learner in the school, were unlawful.

The Constitutional Court will have to decide the issue of whether on a proper interpretation of the provisions of the Act and other applicable legislation, the power to determine the capacity of a public school in Gauteng vests in the head of the Department or the governing body of the public school as part of its power to determine an admission policy for that public school.

It will also determine whether the head of Department’s decision to admit the learner to the School was lawful and justified.

Mkebe and Another v Absa Bank Limited and Others

 Case No.
  Lower Court Judgments

Hearing Date
  CCT 107/12  North Gauteng High Court, 1 Jun. 2011  14 Mar. 2013

By Duncan Wild on 2 February 2013

Issue
The Court will have to decide whether, in circumstances where a judgment was granted in the absence of the defendant that could allow those defendant’s home to be sold, the requirements to allow those defendants to have the judgment set aside (in a rescission application) and defend the claims should be changed or interpreted in favour of the person seeking to have the judgment overturned.

The Case
Mr Siphelo Mkebe and his wife Ms Nokuhle Mkebe (“the Mkebes“) had entered into a mortgage agreement over certain property with Absa. According to Absa they defaulted and Absa obtained a default judgment against the Mkebes.  They then brought an application to rescind that judgment, but shortly before their hearing their attorneys withdrew, according to the Mkebes, because the attorneys had not received instructions.  Mr Mkebe alleges that he attempted to attend at the hearing himself but could not find the court and the rescission application was dismissed.

A second application to rescind the dismissal of the first application was then brought in which the Mkebes alleged they were not in “wilful default” and that they had a reasonable explanation for the default (the withdrawal of their attorneys on the basis of a lack of instructions and the attempt to attend at the court) and that Absa had not complied with the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (“NCA“) prior to obtaining judgment against them, so they had a reasonable prospect of success.

The alleged non-compliance related to the transmission of a notice in terms of section 129 of the NCA that must be sent prior to approaching a court to have the mortgaged property attached and sold. Absa does not deny that it had an agreement to send the section 129 notice to the Mkebe’s physical address under the agreement’s “domicilium” clause.  But, Absa did not send the notice to this address, rather electing to send the notice by registered post to the Mkebe’s last known postal address. The Mkebes argue that this means the judgment should not have been granted against them, and so they have a bona fide defence to the claim by Absa, and so should succeed in the rescission application.

The High Court rejected both these arguments, saying first that a failure to instruct your attorneys was not sufficient excuse to justify not defending the action, and second that the Mkebe’s had not stated they had not received the 129 notice, just that it was sent to an address not agreed in the contract between the parties. The Supreme Court of Appeal refused to grant leave to appeal against the judgment.

Occupiers of Portions 124 and 150 of the Farm Zandfontein 317JR v Brookway Property 30 (Pty) Ltd and Another

 Case No. Lower Court Judgments Hearing Date Judgment Date
CCT 69/11 North Gauteng High Court, 30 Sep. 2010 30 Aug. 2012 TBA

This application for leave to appeal pertains to an eviction order for the removal of approximately 800 occupiers from privately owned land.  In the Constitutional Court, the occupiers applied for an order that the allocation of alternative accommodation, by the City of Tshwane, should be a precondition to their eviction.  The occupiers further sought an order requiring the City to compensate the landowner for their occupation.  The City did not oppose the application for leave to appeal.  It did however submit that it was unfair to expect municipalities to carry the cost of providing alternative accommodation, and that this burden rests also on the provincial and national spheres of government.

On 30 August 2012, the Constitutional Court postponed the application following the liquidation of the landowner.  Costs remain the only outstanding matter to be decided.

Grootboom v National Prosecuting Authority & Another

Case No.  Lower Court Judgments  Hearing Date
CCT 08/13 Labour Court, 18 Dec. 2009

Labour Appeal Court, 21 Sep. 2012

 23 May 2013

By Michael Dafel on 16 April 2013.

This matter stems from a decision by the NPA to invoke section 17(5)(a)(i) of the Public Service Act 103 of 1994 (Act) to discharge the employment services of Mr Grootboom.  In the Constitutional Court, Mr Grootboom seeks an order for that decision to be set aside. Continue reading