KwaZulu-Natal Joint Liaison Committee v Member of the Executive Council Department of Education, KwaZulu-Natal and Others

Case No.
Lower Court Judgments Hearing Date Judgment Date Majority Author
Vote
CCT 60/12 KwaZulu-Natal High Court, 4 Oct. 2011 22 Nov. 2012 25 Apr. 2013 Cameron J. 6-4

By Duncan Wild on 25 April 2013

The KwaZulu-Natal Joint Liaison Committee (“”the Committee“) is an association of independent schools that describe themselves as impoverished and dependent on State subsidies.  The Committee brought the case on the basis that the KwaZulu-Natal Department of Education (“the Department“) issued a notice in September 2008 setting out “approximate” subsidies for the 2009/2010 year.  The subsidies actually paid out were on average 30% less than stipulated in the notice.

The question the Constitutional Court had to determine is whether issuing the notice, against a background of payments in previous years that did align with the amounts set out in the notices, created a binding obligation to pay the amounts set out in the notice.

A secondary question, in part argued by the amicus, the Centre for Child Law, is that bearing in mind the right to basic education, the issuing of the notice created a legitimate expectation amongst the schools that the subsidies would not be significantly reduced when paid.

In the main judgment authored by Justice Cameron (and concurred in by Moseneke DCJ, Froneman J, Khampepe J, Skweyiya J and Yacoob J), it was held that the notice did not give rise to a contractual obligation.  The notice did, however, find that once a public official had made a public statement of a promise to pay specified amounts, that amount could not be unilaterally reduced after the due date for payment. The Constitutional Court therefore overturned the High Court decision and ordered the Department to pay the approximate amounts specified in the 2008 notice.  Continue reading

Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children and Another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Another

Case No.  Lower Court Judgments  Hearing Date
CCT 12/2013
North Gauteng High Court, 4 Jan. 2013 30 May 2013

By Avani Singh on 29 April 2013.

This case comes before the Constitutional Court by way of confirmation proceedings in terms of section 172(2) of the Constitution, following the North Gauteng High Court (“NGHC”) per Rabie J having declared sections of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 (“the Act”) to be unconstitutional. Continue reading

Mayelane v Ngwenyama and Another (Women’s Legal Centre Trust as Amicus Curiae)

Case No.
Lower Court Judgments Hearing Date Judgment Date Majority Author
Vote
CCT 57/12 North Gauteng High Court, 24 Mar. 2010
SCA, 1 Jun. 2012
20 Nov. 2012 30 May 2013 Froneman J, Khampepe J and Skweyiya J. Unanimous
By Michael Dafel on 31 May 2013

In a matter that will in all likelihood prove significant for the future regulation of polygamous customary marriages in South Africa, the Constitutional Court, without invitation from the parties and without hearing argument, developed living customary law of the Xitsonga (Tsonga) community to include a requirement that the first wife must provide her consent for her husband to marry subsequent wives.  For the majority of the Court, this legal development was necessitated to ensure that customary practices are in conformity with Constitutional values. Continue reading

Grootboom v National Prosecuting Authority & Another

Case No.  Lower Court Judgments  Hearing Date
CCT 08/13 Labour Court, 18 Dec. 2009
Labour Appeal Court, 21 Sep. 2012
 23 May 2013

By Michael Dafel on 16 April 2013.

This matter stems from a decision by the NPA to invoke section 17(5)(a)(i) of the Public Service Act 103 of 1994 (Act) to discharge the employment services of Mr Grootboom.  In the Constitutional Court, Mr Grootboom seeks an order for that decision to be set aside. Continue reading

M&G Media Limited and Others v Chipu NO and Others

Case No.  Lower Court Judgments  Hearing Date
 CCT 136/12 North Gauteng High Court, 9 Dec 2012  14 May 2013

Disclosure: Webber Wentzel is representing the appellants in this matter. Duncan Wild, Greg Palmer and Ben Winks have been involved in the instruction. The author of this post is independent of Webber Wentzel and has not been involved in the matter.

By Michael Dafel on 29 April 2013.

In this matter, members of the media have called on the Constitutional Court to determine the constitutionality of section 21(5) of the Refugees Act 130 of 1998.  The provision states that ‘the confidentiality of asylum applications and the information contained therein must be ensured at all times’.  The media argue that the provision is unconstitutional in so far as it entails a blanket ban on media access to Refugee Appeal Board (“the RAB“) hearings.  They argue that the RAB must be vested with a discretion on whether, and on what conditions, to allow media access to an asylum hearing.  The state, on the other hand, argues that a blanket ban is necessary to ensure the safety of asylum applicants as well as their family and witnesses.

This case stems out of a decision of the RAB to refuse members of the media access to the asylum appeal of Radovan Krejcir.  Mr Krejcir is a fugitive from the Czech Republic, and since entering South Africa on a false passport in 2007 has been allegedly linked to crimes committed in South Africa.  Owing to the refusal, the media approached the High Court for an order reviewing the RAB’s decision on the grounds that it should have interpreted section 21(5) as affording it a discretion to permit media access, or alternatively declaring section 21(5) unconstitutional to the extent that it doesn’t afford such a discretion.  The North Gauteng High Court held that, although the provision limits the section 16 right to freedom of expression, this limitation is nonetheless reasonable and justifiable owing to the need to protect asylum applicants.  The media’s interest in access to the hearings was substantially outweighed by the privacy and dignity interests of asylum seekers, the safety of their witnesses, and the integrity of the asylum system as a whole. Continue reading

The Governing Body of the Rivonia Primary School v MEC for Education, Gauteng Province

 

 Case No.  Lower Court Judgments  Hearing Date
 CCT 135/12 South Gauteng High Court, 7 Dec. 2011

Supreme Court of Appeal, 30 Nov. 2012

 9 May 2013

By Greg Palmer on 17 April 2013.

The case concerns whether it is the Provincial Department of Education or the governing body of a public school that has the power to determine the number of learners that the school may admit, and whether the Provincial Department of Education may override any determination in this respect by a governing body.

In 2010 the governing body of Rivonia Primary School (“the School“) had prepared an admission policy which was accepted by the Gauteng Department of Education (“the Department“).  According to this policy the capacity of the school was set at 770 learners, of which 120 would be admitted to Grade 1.

The School had declined to admit a child to its Grade 1 class for the 2011 school year. The child was twentieth on the waiting list of applicants for admission. The mother of the child appealed to officials in the Department. A few weeks into the 2011 school year the head of the Department instructed the principal of the School to admit the child. Before the governing body of the School had made a decision on the instructions of the Head of Department, in a letter to the principal the Head of the Department purported to withdraw the principal’s admission function. Officials from the Department arrived at the School shortly thereafter to physically place the child in a classroom.

The relevant provision is Section 5(5) of the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996 (“the Act“), which provides that subject to the Act and any applicable provincial law, “the admission policy of a public school is determined by the governing body of such school.”

The South Gauteng High Court held, per Mbha J, that the Act does not appropriate to the school governing body the unqualified power to determine the school’s admission policy, and that the power to determine the maximum capacity of a public school in Gauteng vests in the Gauteng Department and not in the school governing body.  It also held that the Member of the Executive for Education, Gauteng Province, has the power to intervene in the school governing body’s power to determine the admission policy of a public school.

The Supreme Court of Appeal, per Cachalia JA writing for a unanimous court, held that the governing body’s power under section 5(5) of the Act to determine the admission policy of a school necessarily includes the power to determine the school’s capacity.  Any doubt of this is removed by section 5A of the Act, which allows the Minister of Education to prescribe minimum and uniform norms and standards for ‘the capacity of a school in respect of the number of learners a school can admit’, and then requires the school’s governing body to comply with these norms and standards when compiling the school’s admission policy.

The Supreme Court of Appeal overturned the order of the High Court (save for the order of costs in that court, and relief pertaining to the withdrawal of the School principal’s admission function), and declared that the instruction given to the School principal to admit the learner contrary to the school’s admission policy, and the placing of the learner in the school, were unlawful.

The Constitutional Court will have to decide the issue of whether on a proper interpretation of the provisions of the Act and other applicable legislation, the power to determine the capacity of a public school in Gauteng vests in the head of the Department or the governing body of the public school as part of its power to determine an admission policy for that public school.

It will also determine whether the head of Department’s decision to admit the learner to the School was lawful and justified.

The Association of Regional Magistrates of Southern Africa v The President of the Republic of South Africa and Others

Case No.
Lower Court Judgments Hearing Date Judgment Date Majority Author
Vote
CCT 91/12
North Gauteng High Court, 3 Sep. 2012 19 Feb. 2013 23 May 2013 Nkabinde J. Unanimous

By Duncan Wild on 23 May 2013.

The case is an application to confirm an order of invalidity of the decision by the Independent Commission for the Remuneration of Public Office Bearers published by the President on 26 November 2010 that increased the remuneration of public officer bearers, including Regional Magistrates and Regional Court Presidents (“the Magistrates“) by 5% backdated to 1 April 2010.The decision was challenged in the High Court on the basis that: (1) due to the effect of inflation the “increase” was in fact a decrease, which was impermissible; (2) the Magistrates were not given adequate opportunity to make representations prior to the President’s decision; (3) the President adopted a “one-size-fits-all” approach to the increase without differentiating between different categories of office bearers as required by the Remuneration Commission Act; and (4) the President did not take into account relevant considerations, was unreasonable and irrational.

The High Court found the decision was not administrative action and so not reviewable under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act, but was reviewable under the principle of legality.  The High Court dismissed the first two grounds on which the decision was challenged, but found that the decision should have and did not differentiate between different categories of office bearer, and so was invalid in respect of the increase applicable to the Magistrates.  Continue reading

Rademan v Moqhaka Municipality and Others

Case No.
Lower Court Judgments Hearing Date Judgment Date Majority Author
Vote
CCT 41/12
Free State High Court, 2 Sep. 2010
SCA, 1 Dec. 2011
5 Feb. 2013
26 Apr. 2013 Zondo J. Unanimous

Ms Olga Rademan lives within the Moqhaka Municipality (“the Municipality“), and refused to pay taxes and levies on her property.   She is a member of the Moqhaka Rate Payers’ and Residents’ Association to which she pays the amount due in respect of property rates. She had however paid the Municipality what was due for services, including electricity.  On 17 August 2009, Ms Rademan’s electricty supply was cut off by the municipality. 

Ms Rademan brought an urgent application before the Kroonstaad magistrate’s court for the restoration of her electricity supply and this was granted. The Municipality appealed to the High Court, and the High Court overturned the Magistrate’s decision finding that the Municipality was within its rights to disconnect Ms Rademan’s electricity. The Supreme Court of Appeal agreed with the High Court, and Ms Rademan appealed to the Constitutional Court. 

Justice Zondo, writing for the Court, held that the legislative framework applicable to the dispute at hand did allow the Municipality to amalgamate the different accounts for services rendered (like water, electricity, waste management) into one consolidated account.  The effect of this debt consolidation is that the non-payment of any portion of the account causes the ratepayer to be in arrears on the entire consolidated debt and the Municipality is resultantly entitled to reduce or withhold the delivery of services such as electricity.  In essence, the Constitutional Court held that a ratepayer cannot choose which of the municipal service they pay.  Accordingly, the Constiutional Court found that Ms Rademan’s account was in arrears, and that the Municipality was entitled to discontinue the supply of electricity to her household. Continue reading

Agri South Africa v The Minister of Minerals and Energy

Case No. Lower Court Judgments Hearing Date Judgment Date Majority Author Vote
CCT 80/12 North Gauteng High Court, 28 Apr. 2011
SCA, 31 May 2012
8 Nov. 2012 18 Apr. 2013 Mogoeng CJ Unanimous

By Ben Winks on 19 April 2013

Background

The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act of 2002 (the MPRDA) entered into force on 1 May 2004 and fundamentally reformed the mineral rights regime in South Africa.  Previously, under the Minerals Act of 1991 and its predecessors, minerals were owned by private parties, and could be exploited or not exploited by them as they saw fit, subject to state regulation.  The MPRDA, however, provides that all minerals are the common heritage of the people of South Africa, and that the state, as the custodian of these resources for the benefit of all South Africans, may grant, refuse and administer mineral rights and charge royalties for their exercise (Section 3).

To ensure security of tenure and minimise disruption in the mining industry, the MPRDA introduced detailed transitional arrangements as a bridge between the old order and the new (Schedule 2).  Thus, from 1 May 2004: the holders of old order mining rights had five years to apply for new order mining rights; the holders of old order prospecting rights had two years to apply for new order prospecting rights; and the holders of unused old order rights (rights to minerals in respect of which no prospecting or mining had yet commenced) had one year to apply for new order prospecting or mining rights.

Before the MPRDA entered into force, Sebenza Mining held coal rights on and under certain farms, but it was wound up before conducting any prospecting or mining.  These coal rights were thus “unused old order rights” under the transitional provisions of the MPRDA and, as Sebenza was not in a position to pay the fees to convert them into new order rights, they expired one year after the commencement of the MPRDA.  Sebenza’s liquidators claimed compensation from the Department of Mineral Resources, contending that the coal rights had been expropriated.  The Department rejected the claim, which was then ceded to Agri SA, who instituted action in the Pretoria High Court as a test case on the alleged expropriatory effects of the MPRDA.

The High Court held that expropriation requires deprivation of property and acquisition of substantially the same property by the state.  The High Court found that the MPRDA not only destroyed pre-existing mineral rights but vested the substance of those rights in the state, and thus effected not only deprivation but expropriation of unused old order rights, for which just and equitable compensation was payable under section 25 of the Constitution.

The Minister of Mineral Resources (the Minister) appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal (the SCA), which agreed broadly with the High Court’s definition of expropriation, but disagreed that the MPRDA had that effect.  After a thorough exposition of the history of mining legislation in South Africa, the SCA held unanimously that the essential “right to mine”, from which all mineral rights are derived, had always been vested in the state, and allocated by it to private parties in differing degrees over the years.  Thus, the SCA held that no blanket expropriation of mineral rights had been brought about by the MPRDA, but that it remained possible that a specific holder of old order mineral rights might be able to prove that the MPRDA had the effect of expropriating their particular mineral rights.

Agri SA applied to the Constitutional Court for leave to appeal, while the Minister sought leave for a conditional cross-appeal, which was ultimately immaterial.

The Constitutional Court decided unanimously that Agri SA should be granted leave to appeal, as it had raised important constitutional issues and had reasonable prospects of success, but that the appeal itself should be dismissed.  The Court was divided, however, as to why the appeal should fail. Continue reading

Grootboom v National Prosecuting Authority & Another

Case No.  Lower Court Judgments  Hearing Date
CCT 08/13 Labour Court, 18 Dec. 2009

Labour Appeal Court, 21 Sep. 2012

 23 May 2013

By Michael Dafel on 16 April 2013.

This matter stems from a decision by the NPA to invoke section 17(5)(a)(i) of the Public Service Act 103 of 1994 (Act) to discharge the employment services of Mr Grootboom.  In the Constitutional Court, Mr Grootboom seeks an order for that decision to be set aside. Continue reading