On 30 October 2014
The central question in this case is the extent to which the South African Police Service (SAPS) has domestic and/or international law obligations to investigate alleged crimes against humanity, including torture, committed by Zimbabweans in Zimbabwe. The High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal (the SCA) found that, on the facts of this particular case, SAPS were indeed obliged to investigate these allegations.
The Constitutional Court in a unanimous judgment dismissed the appeal by the SAPS and ordered SAPS to investigate the alleged crimes.
Two acting justices are currently, or will soon be serving on the Constitutional Court, in view of the vacancies occassionaed by the retirement of Justice Skweyiya, and Justice Jafta’s leave.
Acting Justice Monica Leeuw, the Judge President of the North West Division has been appointed to serve from 1 August 2014 until 31 December 2014 in the place of Justice Skweyiya.
Acting Justice Zukisa Tshiqi, currently a serving on the Supreme Court of Appeal will serve from 1 November 2014 to 31 March 2014 in the place of Justice Jafta.
By Duncan Wild on 3 October 2014
The primary question in this case was whether a third party can bring a claim against the party to a contract (where the claimant is not a party to the contract) as a result of loss suffered by the third party caused by the intentional repudiation of the contract.
The Constitutional Court, in a unanimous judgment by Justice Khampepe dismissed the appeal, finding that that cancellation of the contract in question was not wrongful as it did not fit within the existing law concerning interference with a contract, and nor was it necessary to recognise such a claim.
By Duncan Wild on 28 September 2014
The case concerns whether the age requirement in the recruitment polices of the South African Police Service (“SAPS“), unfairly discriminate of the basis of age.
The Constitutional Court denied the applicant leave to appeal on the basis that he had only raised a challenge to constitutionality of the SAPS recruitment age bar on appeal, which is not acceptable. In addition, the Commissioner of the SAPS had raised the age bar from 30 years, which is set in the application regulations, to 40, and if the Court were to set aside the decision to raise the age limit to 40 years, this would leave the applicant in worse position, by leaving the 30 year age limit in place. The the Constitutional Court held would not be in the interests of justice. Continue reading
By Duncan Wild on 30 August 2014
This is a claim seeking to expand the South African common law to recognise a claim for “wrongful life”, or what the applicant calls “wrongful suffering”. Historically, such claim have arisen where a medical professional is alleged to have failed to inform parents that there is a high risk that a foetus may be born with abnormalities, and had the parents been informed, they not have permitted the foetus to be born. The applicants seek to cast the claim as one for “wrongful suffering”, seeking to emphasise that it is not claim with the basis that it would have been better for the child not be born, but that in failing to give the accurate information, the physician caused the suffering of the child once it was born. At present neither of these claims exist in South African law, and the applicant seeks to have such a claim recognised. Continue reading
By Michael Mbikiwa on 25 August 2014
This application is about the determination of the king of the Pedi nation. The applicant, a traditional authority recognised under the Traditional Leadership and Governance Framework Act 41 of 2003 (‘the Framework Act’), seeks to review and set aside a determination made by the Commission for Traditional Leadership Disputes and Claims (commonly known as ‘the Nhlapo Commission’) that the kingship of the Pedi nation resorts in Acting Kgošikgolo Sekhukhune III – and not in Kgoši Mampuru Mampuru III, the applicant’s leader. Continue reading
By Duncan Wild on 13 August 2014
The case concerns a challenge to an order declaring the first and second appellants (Mr and Mrs Stratford) insolvent, as well as a challenge to the provisions of section 9(4A)(a)(ii) of the Insolvency Act. This section prescribes the manner in which an employee of the debtor is to receive notice of an application for the sequestration of the debtor’s estate. As the law currently stands, this section has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of Appeal to apply only to notice to a debtor’s business employees, however, the appellants claim that it must be interpreted to apply also to a debtor’s domestic employees. Continue reading